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Abstract
We consider a set-up with vertical contracting between a supplier and a retail
industry where a large retailer competes with smaller retailers that carry a nar-
rower range of products. Consumers are heterogeneous in their shopping costs;
they will either be multistop shoppers or one-stop shoppers. The countervailing
power of the large retailer is modeled as a threat of demand-side substitution.
We show that retail prices are higher, and industry surplus and social welfare
fall, when the large retailer possesses countervailing power. Increasing marginal
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demand substitution less attractive for the large retailer.
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1 Introduction
The recent decades have seen the growing dominance of powerful big-box retailers, which
attract consumers through one-stop shopping. Another important trend in the retail
industry is the polarization of store size. Increasingly, mid-sized general merchandise
retailers are squeezed out by big-box retailers and small speciality stores or hard-discount
chains (Griffith and Krampf, 1997, or more recently, Igami, 2011). As a result, big-box
retailers often dominate the local retail market, in which they mainly compete with
much smaller stores (for example, speciality stores).
At the same time, big-box retailers’ success allows them to obtain more favorable
terms from their suppliers. Competition authorities worldwide have expressed concerns
about the impact of this countervailing power on consumers: countervailing power is
socially desirable if the lower prices paid by large retailers to their suppliers are passed
on to consumers. While the question of whether countervailing power is desirable for
reducing retail prices has been discussed by legal and economic scholars since the 1950s
without reaching a firm conclusion, this paper shows instead that countervailing power
raises retail prices and decreases social welfare. When a large retailer possesses counter-
vailing power it is not necessarily the consumer who benefits! The analysis uses a model
that captures the main ingredients of the modern retail industry: the polarization of
store size at the retail level and consumer shopping costs.
To be more specific, we consider a situation where a supplier sells to a retail industry.
To capture the polarization of the retail industry and consumer shopping costs, we use
the retail competition model developed by Chen and Rey (2012): a large retailer attracts
consumers through one-stop shopping, and competes with much smaller retailers that
focus on narrower product lines. Consumers are heterogeneous in their shopping costs
and will be either multistop shoppers or one-stop shoppers depending on their shopping
costs. To allow the possibility of profit-sharing between the supplier and the large
retailer, we use two-part tariffs for contracts between the supplier and the large retailer.1
The countervailing power of the large retailer is modeled as a threat of demand-side
substitution.2
1The analysis in two-part tariffs is not restrictive; more general contracts can be considered.
2This is in line with Katz (1987), in which the source of large retailer’s countervailing power is
modeled as a credible threat of securing an independent source of supply.
See also Ellison and Snyder (2010), who find evidence for the importance of supplier competition,
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The supplier faces a trade-off between maximizing joint profits and extracting sur-
plus. We show that, in this setting, joint profits maximization calls for wholesale prices
equal to marginal cost. The supplier sells at marginal cost to the large retailer and
the small retailers. While the presence of small retailers generates competitive pressure,
it allows the large retailer to distinguish consumers according to their shopping costs,
and this is best achieved through wholesale prices which are set at marginal cost. By
contrast, surplus extraction is effective when the supplier instead charges high wholesale
prices. By inducing less intrabrand competition through higher wholesale prices to the
small retailers, the supplier makes it less attractive for the large retailer to switch to
the alternative sources of supply. The reason is that by increasing the wholesale price
to small retailers, the supplier discourages multistop shopping behavior of some con-
sumers. The screening strategy of the large retailer with respect to consumers becomes
less effective and higher wholesale price to the smaller retailers can thus be optimal
for the supplier to disadvantage the large retailer. At the same time, the screening
strategy of the large retailer is best achieved through a higher wholesale price to the
large retailer when the wholesale prices of the small retailers increase. The fixed fee
paid to the supplier by the large retailer decreases as the countervailing power of the
large retailer increases. When the large retailer possesses a large enough countervail-
ing power, the supplier pays a slotting fee (negative fixed fee) to the large retailer. In
the end, high wholesale prices appear as a surplus extraction device rather than joint
profits maximization. Industry surplus falls, as does consumer surplus, which results
in a lower social welfare when the large retailer possesses countervailing power. The
lower prices paid by the large retailer to the supplier (through a lower fixed fee) are
not passed on to consumers. Countervailing power of the large retailer instead leads to
higher prices for consumers, which echoes concerns voiced by many antitrust authorities
according to which countervailing power may not lead to lower retail prices (Federal
Trade Commission, 2001, Part IV; European Commission, 2011).3
Since Galbraith (1952, 1954), who argues that by exercising countervailing power,
for the ability of large buyers to extract discounts from suppliers. They use data on wholesale prices
for antibiotics sold to the U.S. market (drugstores and hospitals).
3Similar analysis is also suggested by Caprice and Rey (2015) when large retailers join forces to
negotiate with suppliers. They show that joint listing decisions can enhance the bargaining position of
the retailing chains without affecting final prices or even leading to higher final prices.
See also Foros and Kind (2008) and Doyle and Han (2014) for various models leading to higher retail
prices when buyer power applies.
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large retailers are able to lower the prices they pay their suppliers and pass on these sav-
ings to their consumers, countervailing power’s impact has been elaborately discussed.4
Our paper is not the first to demonstrate that countervailing power of large retailers can
lead to higher consumer prices. In this regard, the analysis by von Ungern-Sternberg
(1996) and Dobson and Waterson (1997) is particularly relevant. They show that under
certain conditions increased concentration at the retail level may lead to higher retail
prices. However their models, while adequate for their purposes, do not capture the
retail industry ingredients that we mention above, such as the polarization of store size.
In their models, all retail firms are symmetric. Moreover, these authors assume that
upstream firms use linear pricing, which makes their analysis irrelevant to many retail
industries in which nonlinear pricing is prevalent, especially when suppliers contract
large retailers.5
By contrast, Chen (2003), using a model which captures the polarization of store size
and nonlinear pricing, shows that countervailing power possessed by a large retailer leads
to a fall in retail prices for consumers. The fall in retail prices is achieved through a fall
in the wholesale prices of small retailers, which is the result of a supplier trying to offset
the reduction in profits caused by the rise in countervailing power of the large retailer.6
To capture the polarization of store size, Chen (2003) assumes that the downstream
market is characterized by a dominant retailer facing a competitive fringe. In reality
however, the main evolution of the retail industry is not characterized by this kind of
asymmetry. Rather, large retailers offer a wide range of products while small retailers
offer a narrower line of products. Moreover, large retailers attract consumers through
one-stop shopping. At the theoretical level, Chen’s (2003) modeling approach does not
take into account this main ingredient.7 Since Chen and Rey (2012) propose a simple way
4Many researchers have investigated this topic in various models. For recent contributions, see Iozzi
and Valletti (2014); Chen et al. (2016) and Gaudin (2017). Discussions are available in Snyder (2005)
and Chen (2007).
5See Villas-Boas (2007), and Bonnet and Dubois (2010) for evidence of such contracts in vertical
contracting.
6Mills (2013) finds similar results with another mechanism.
7Another difference should be mentioned. Unlike in Chen (2003), where the supplier and the large
retailer share the joint profits from their transaction, in our model, countervailing power is modeled
by demand-side substitution. We will discuss this point in Section 4. With Chen’s (2003) modeling of
the countervailing power, only wholesale prices of the small retailers are affected when countervailing
power changes. However, we will show in our set-up that countervailing power still leads to higher retail
prices. Moreover, retail prices are now increasing in the countervailing power of the large retailer.
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to consider this phenomenon, we use their retail competition model. Then, we add to
their framework a vertical contracting setup to study the impact of countervailing power.
It is thus shown that by capturing this feature (consumers are either one-stop shoppers
or multistop shoppers) countervailing power can lead to higher retail prices. In other
words, it is the combination of both "seller power" and "countervailing power" which
explains that the countervailing power of the large retailer reduces social welfare. The
results from our analysis confirm the importance of the polarization of store size and the
existence of shopping costs in the debates about countervailing power. When shopping
costs matter small retailers do not compete fiercely with large retailers. Instead, as
shown by Chen and Rey (2012), their existence may benefit the large retailers, as they
may exert seller power by screening consumers. Moreover, the value the consumers give
to the small retailers play a role in the screening strategy of the large retailers when they
discriminate consumers with respect to their shopping costs. Higher wholesale prices for
the small retailers can thus make the strategy for large retailers to switch to alternative
sources of supply less attractive.
A small range of literature now exists that mixes vertical contracting and shopping
costs (Caprice and von Schlippenbach, 2013; Johansen and Nilssen, 2016). Caprice
and von Schlippenbach (2013) show that, when one-stop shopping behavior is consid-
ered, slotting fees may emerge as a result of a rent-shifting mechanism in a three-party
negotiation framework, where a monopolistic retailer negotiates sequentially with two
competing or independent suppliers about two-part tariff contracts. The wholesale price
negotiated with the first supplier is distorted upwards, and the first supplier may pay
a slotting fee, as long as its bargaining power vis-à-vis the retailer is not too large.
One-stop shopping behavior involves complementarity between products. This allows
the retailer and the first supplier to extract rent from the second supplier. Johansen and
Nilssen (2016) study a merger game between retailing stores to look into the incentives
of independent stores to form a big store when some consumers have preferences for one-
stop shopping. They show that one-stop shopping behavior may lead to an improvement
in the bargaining position of the merged entity vis-à-vis producers, through the creation
of an inside option that small stores do not have. In the present paper, we are interested
in the impact of shopping costs on intrabrand competition between the large retailer and
the small retailers when the supplier negotiates contracts with retailers, while Caprice
and von Schlippenbach (2013) and Johansen and Tore (2016) focus on the changes in
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interbrand competition due to these shopping costs. Our findings confirm that shopping
costs are a key ingredient of the competition between retailers (intrabrand competition)
when a supplier negotiates with retailers.
The paper contributes to the large literature on vertical contracting with both public
and secret contracts. Hart and Tirole (1990) document the opportunism problem arising
in secret vertical contracts. Retail prices fall and the supplier cannot get the monopoly
profits. In secret contracts, threat of demand-side substitution alters only the sharing
of industry profits and not the prices.8 In public contracts, demand-side substitution
threat results in a decrease in retail price (Caprice, 2006; Inderst and Wey, 2011; Inderst
and Shaffer, 2011).9 Wholesale prices decrease to impair the outside option of retailers.10
In this paper, we exhibit a similar mechanism except that wholesale prices increase to
impair the outside option of the large retailer due to the shopping behavior of consumers.
Again, our analysis suggests that consumer shopping costs may change the framework
of the negotiations between the suppliers and the retailers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first present the model and the
subgame-perfect equilibrium when the large retailer does not possess countervailing
power (Section 2), before showing how countervailing power may lead to higher retail
prices as well as a fall of social welfare (Section 3). Section 4 considers alternative
modelings of the countervailing power and discusses the robustness of our insights.
Section 5 concludes.
8See also Rey and Tirole (2007) for a review of this literature.
We should mention that, while a supplier faces an opportunism problem when negotiating with com-
peting retailers, such a problem would not arise in our setting. Remember, joint profits maximization
(when the countervailing power of the large retailer is absent) calls for wholesale prices equal to mar-
ginal cost: the supplier sells at marginal cost to the large retailer and the small retailers to maximize
industry profits.
9When contracts are secret and an efficient supplier competes against an inefficient fringe of rivals,
Caprice (2006) shows that banning price discrimination (which restores the publicity of contracts)
may cause per-unit prices to fall and welfare to increase. The dominant supplier takes advantage of
a strategic bargaining effect: reducing the price per-unit makes the outside option of buying from the
fringe less profitable, allowing the dominant supplier to extract more bargaining surplus through the
fixed fee.
10A similar trade-off arises in Montez (2007), but in another context.
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2 The Model
Description of the model
The relationships between a supplier, retailers and consumers are modeled as follows.
There are two levels of market: the upstream and the downstream market. In the
upstream market, a supplier sells its product  to a large retailer  and a competitive
fringe . In the downstream market, these retailers resell the product to consumers.
We assume this retail market structure represents the polarization of store size that
we mention in the introduction, according to which large chain stores compete against
traditional, independent retailers (large-scale retail giants versus small speciality stores).
We assume that the contract between the supplier and the large retailer  takes the
form of two-part tariffs. Let  and , respectively be the wholesale price and the fixed
fee which are paid to the supplier by the large retailer. The two-part tariff in this model
is a simple way to approximate nonlinear contracts.11 Further, contracts between the
supplier and the competitive fringe  are linear tariffs. As small retailers are modeled
as a competitive fringe, considering nonlinear contracts for small retailers does not add
anything in terms of contracting efficiency.12 Let  be the wholesale price paid to the
supplier by small retailers.
We use the framework from Chen and Rey (2012) for the retail competition in our
setup. General retailing supply and demand conditions are considered.  and  offer
different varieties  and  for the good . We call this market the competitive
market. The good , which corresponds to the monopoly market is provided only by
the large retailer. We denote the consumer valuations and the constant unit retailing
costs for,  and by ,  and  and ,  and  respectively ( represents the
all-inclusive cost of retailing ). Small retailers supply  at cost ( =  + ), thus
offering consumers a value −, where  = − . We assume that small retailers
 are more efficient than  in this segment (otherwise,  would not sell anything, and
multistop shopping would never arise):    =  − ( 0). For instance,  can
include chained, cost cutting hard discounters (  ), or specialist stores that offer
more service (  ). , however, benefits from its broader range ( =  −   0),
11The analysis would not be affected if we considered more general contracts as  (), where 
corresponds to the quantity ordered by the large retailer. The appendix is available upon request.
12Linear prices allow the supplier to extract all the surplus from the small retailers as small retailers
compete fiercely.
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and overall offers a higher value:    which implies  =  +    for any
 ≥ 0. We allow for general distributions of the shopping cost , which is characterized
by a cumulative distribution function  () and a density function  (). Intuitively,
consumers with a high  favor one-stop shopping, whereas those with a lower  can
take advantage of multi-stop shopping; the mix of multistop and one-stop shoppers is,
however, endogenous and depends on ’s prices,  and .
We consider the following game (simultaneous public offers):
• At stage one, offers to retailers are made simultaneously and are assumed to be
public.  either accepts or rejects.
• Then, at stage two, the large retailer  sets  and , and retail prices of the
small retailers are given by  =  + .
We will introduce countervailing power of the large retailer in the next section, but
first we solve the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game to have a benchmark case
in which the large retailer does not possess countervailing power.
The benchmark case13
At stage two, let  = − +− − denote ’s total margin, thus offering
the consumer value −− from purchasing  and . One-stop shoppers prefer
 to , as long as −− ≥ − and are indeed willing to patronize , as long
as  ≤ −− . Moreover, consumers favor multistop shopping if the additional
cost of visiting  is lower than the extra value it offers:  ≤  −  − ( −  − ),
where  =  −  − denotes ’s margin on . Figure 1 provides a description of
the buying decision of the consumers according to their shopping cost.
M u lt is to p s h o p p e r s O n e ‐ s to p s h o p p e r s
0  S S L L Lv w v w r    AL L ALv w r 
s
Figure 1: Shopping decision according to the shopping cost
13The large retailer does not possess countervailing power.
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The total demand is given by  ( −  − ).  faces a demand  ( −  − )−
 ( −  − ( −  − )) for both products (from one-stop shoppers) and an addi-
tional demand  ( −  − ( −  − )) for product  only (from multistop shop-
pers). Small retailers supply  ( −  − ( −  − )) for product . ’s gross
profit-maximization problem can be written as:
max
 =  [ ( −  − )−  ( −  − ( −  − ))]
+ ( −  − ( −  − ))
=  ( −  − )−  ( −  − ( −  − ))
where  =  −  =  −  denotes ’s margin on .
To characterize further the optimal retail pricing strategy, in what follows we assume
that the inverse hazard rate,  () =  ()  ()  is strictly increasing.14 It results in
optimal retail margins  and  as follows.15
Loss leading arises and  is characterized by the first-order condition:
 = − ( −  − ( −  − 
))
 ( −  − ( −  − )) = − ( −  − ( −  − 
))  0
Moreover, in the absence of any restriction on its total margin  (i.e., −− ≥
 −),  maximizes the first term  ( −  − ), which is the monopolistic
gross profit that  could earn if  were not present.  is characterized by the following
first-order condition
 =  ( −  − 
)
 ( −  − ) =  ( −  − 
)  0.
Let  =  ( −  ) denote the monopoly’s margin of  yielding  =  ( −  ).
We assume in the following analysis that  −  ≥ .16
Assumption 1:  −  ≥ , the comparative advantage of the large retailer due
to its broader range is such that it is not constrained on its total margin.
14See Chen and Rey (2012).
15For the sake of exposition we ignore here non negativity price constraint.
16Assumption 1 that follows requires that  ≥ 2 for uniform shopping cost case. For details, see
Appendix G.
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The result is that there is no constraint on the total margin when  −  ≥ 
for   0 with  =  ( − ), or when  −  −  ≥  −  if  ≤ .
Comparative statics
Solving the above equations for margins as functions of, among other things,  and
:  ( ) and  ( ), we get:
Lemma 1 Assume  ≤ , we have  ∈ (−1 0), 
 = 0,
 ∈ (−1 0), 
 ∈
(0 1). Moreover, we have  = − 
 ,
2 = −
22 and an increase in , as
well as an increase in  reduce the large retailer’s profits: (
)
  0 and
()
  0
Proof. See Appendix A.
Total margin is a decreasing function of the wholesale price at which the large retailer
buys from the supplier and does not change with respect to , because of assumption
1 (if  ≤ ). ’s margin on , which is negative, is a decreasing function of  and
an increasing function of . So, the large retailer’s profits are a decreasing function of
the wholesale price at which it can purchase from the supplier, and its profits decrease
as the input price of its rivals (small retailers) increases. The last effect is brought
about by the screening strategy of the large retailer. Because of loss leading on ,
the large retailer can extract more of ’s value from multistop shoppers due to the
presence of its rivals. When  −  decreases, ’s value extraction from multistop
shoppers decreases (the surplus extraction is less effective). It results in an increase
in  (which corresponds to  −  smaller), which leads to a loss in ’s profits. In
other words, a decrease in small retailers’ wholesale price boosts the sales of the small
retailers and imposes a positive externality on the large retailer as the large retailer
benefits from multistop shopping behavior of the consumers. As we will see this relation
is important. When consumers face shopping costs, in case of a screening strategy of
the large retailer, a decrease in the small retailers’ wholesale price increases the profits
of the large retailer. Furthermore, a new bargaining effect, which was absent from
previous models of countervailing power, can arise. In the next section, we will see that
an increase in the small retailers’ wholesale price can decrease the profits that the large
retailer obtains in the case of a disagreement with the efficient supplier, when we assume
demand-side substitution for the large retailer as an outside option.
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At stage one, the supplier sets contracts. In case the large retailer rejects the contract,
’s associated profit is given by the monopoly profit on the product ,  (at the
moment, there is no countervailing power).
The total profit of the supplier is written as:
 [ ( −  −  ())−  ( −  − ( −  −  ( )))] + 
+ ( −  − ( −  −  ( )))
facing the constraint that the large retailer accepts the contract ( ):
 ( ()   ( )   )−  ≥  
 ( −  −  ())− ( −  − ( −  −  ( ))) represents the demand
from one-stop shoppers who buy the product at , and the demand frommultistop shop-
pers who buy at  is  ( −  − ( −  −  ( ))).
The supplier will offer contracts such that the constraint holds with equality. We
thus write the supplier’s optimization problem as:
max
 [ ( −  −  ())−  ( −  − ( −  −  ( )))]
+ ( ()   ( )   ) +  ( −  − ( −  −  ( ))) 
We omit the outside option of the large retailer  , because it does not depend on 
and 
The first-order conditions are (applying the envelope theorem and using the first-
order conditions from stage two):
− 
µ
1 +


¶
 ( −  − )
+ ( − )
µ
1 +


¶
 ( −  − ( −  − )) = 0
− ( − )
µ
1− 


¶
 ( −  − ( −  − )) = 0
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Straightforward computations show that  =  = 017
Proposition 1 (When the large retailer does not possess countervailing power) Joint
profits maximization calls for wholesale prices equal to marginal cost. The supplier sells
at marginal cost to the small retailers, as well as to the large retailer ( =  = 0);
the fixed fee is given by  =  (0 0)−  .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Because the outside option of the large retailer, given by the monopoly profits on 
is independent from the contracts offered to the small retailers, the supplier maximizes
industry surplus to capture the largest share of the surplus. Under assumption 1, the
large retailer is not constrained in its total margin , it behaves like a monopoly on
the bundle, the result is that  = 0. Moreover, as   0 (lemma 1), industry
surplus maximization results in  = 0. Intuitively, the benefits of loss leading, which
come from ’s value extraction are larger, when  −  increases; for this reason, we
obtain  = 0.
3 Effects of countervailing power
In this section, we study the effects of the countervailing power of the large retailer
on consumer prices and social welfare. Some previous papers cited above find that a
large retailer with countervailing power will use that power to obtain lower prices that
it will pass on to consumers. In this section, by contrast, we show that introducing
countervailing power leads to an increase in both wholesale prices (to the large retailer
and to the small retailers) and consequently a decrease in consumer surplus, as well
as a decrease in social welfare. The failure by the large retailer to bring its wholesale
price down, however, does not mean that it pays more to the supplier. We will show
that the fixed fee decreases when the countervailing power of the large retailer increases.
Moreover, its wholesale price is lower than the wholesale price of the small retailers,
however wholesale prices of both large and small retailers are higher compared to the
benchmark case (without countervailing power).
17Second-order conditions are assumed to hold. Second-order conditions indeed hold for uniform
shopping cost case, which is considered in Appendix G.
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The countervailing power of the large retailer is measured by its capacity to obtain
access an alternative supplier. The alternative supplier is modeled as a competitive
fringe; let e be the manufacturing cost of the alternative supplier.18 So, as e falls the
countervailing power of the large retailer increases. We assume that the contracts of the
small retailers are non contingent on the supplier-large retailer contract.19
Figure 2 below depicts the industry structure.
Product
lines
 ,L Lw F Sw
 , LA B
S
 SB
L
Efficient
supplier: c=0
Alternative
supplier
Competitive
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Figure 2: Industry structure in the case of countervailing power
In the case of refusal, let e =  ( − e− e) be the total margin of  (in the
absence of any restriction) and let e =  ( −  − ( − e− e)) be the margin of 
on the good  yielding to e = e ( − e− e)−e ( −  − ( − e− e))
as an outside option. Under assumption 1 ( −  ≥ ), the inequality −e−e ≥
 is satisfied for e   which results in the absence of any restriction on the total
margin in case of refusal, as  − e− e ≥  − .20
18See also, Caprice (2006); Inderst and Shaffer (2011).
19It is worth noting that a breakdown in contracts between the supplier and  is assumed to be
observable but not verifiable (in court) and therefore cannot be contracted upon.
An alternative assumption would be to assume breakdown decision is a contractible contingency,
i.e., that different prices between the supplier and small retailers can be proposed after a breakdown
between the supplier and . This point is discussed in Section 4. Similar discussion can be found in
Caprice (2006).
20Consider instead, the less restrictive assumption ( −  ≥ ) as assumption 1. As a result,
the analysis will not change qualitatively. This change in assumption will require  ≥ 2 instead of
 ≥ 2 for uniform shopping cost case.
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The following lemma helps to understand the bargaining effect we develop next.
Lemma 2 The outside option of the large retailer, which is given by e, decreases in
.
Proof. See Appendix C.
As the participation constraint of the large retailer holds with equality:
 ( ()   ( )   )−  = e () 
the resulting objective function of the supplier is given as:
 [ ( −  −  ())−  ( −  − ( −  −  ( )))]
+  ( −  − ( −  −  ( )))
+  ( ()   ( )   )− e ()
in which e depends on .
Differentiating the objective function with respect to  and , we obtain the
following first-order conditions (We apply the envelope theorem and use the first-order
conditions from stage two to simplify the first-order conditions):
− 
µ
1 +


¶
 ( −  − )
+ ( − )
µ
1 +


¶
 ( −  − ( −  − )) = 0
− ( − )
µ
1− 


¶
 ( −  − ( −  − ))− e ()| {z }
0
= 0
Along the equilibrium path, the large retailer is not constrained in its total margin as long as    ,
which will be the case on equilibrium. Off-equilibrium, constraint on the total retail margin may arise,
but the condition ( −  ≥ ) implies that  − e − e ≥  is satisfied for a high enough
countervailing power, in particular for e = 0, resulting in  − e − e ≥  −  for e small (the
case in which there is no constraint on the total margin). When e is large, the analysis changes, but
the wholesale price of the small retailers still increases when the large retailer possesses countervailing
power, or remains unchanged compared to the benchmark case (without countervailing power).
The analysis can be found for uniform shopping cost in Appendix G.
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Let ∗ and ∗ define the equilibrium wholesale prices which are the solutions of these
first-order conditions.21 The first-order condition with respect to  remains unchanged
when compared to the benchmark case (without countervailing power), while the first-
order condition with respect to  is higher than in the benchmark case. This is because
the outside option only depends on  and depends on it negatively. By concavity of
the objective function, we can conclude first that ∗  0. Then, we can see that the
second term of the first-order condition with respect to  is −() as 
 = − 

(See lemma 1) by using the first-order condition with respect to . As −()  0,
concavity of the objective function yields ∗  0. ∗  ∗ comes from the first-order
condition with respect to  because the term −() is positive.
Proposition 2 Wholesale prices paid by retailers are higher when the large retailer pos-
sesses countervailing power; furthermore, we obtain 0  ∗  ∗. Countervailing power
of the large retailer reduces the supplier’s profits as well as the industry surplus. On the
other hand, the profits of the large retailer increase with its countervailing power. Large
enough countervailing power involves the payment of a slotting fee from the supplier to
the large retailer.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Due to the participation constraint of the large retailer, the equilibrium fixed fee
equals  (∗ ∗)−e (e ∗), we can show that it is decreasing in the countervailing
power of the large retailer. A change in e has a direct effect on e, while it has an
indirect effect on , which results in a decrease in the fixed fee when e decreases.
Moreover, when e  ∗, the fixed fee is negative because of e (e ∗)   (∗ ∗)
(See lemma 1,   0), which results in slotting fees paid from the supplier to the large
retailer when the countervailing power of the large retailer is high. Moreover, the profits
of the large retailer, which are given by e (e ∗), increase when its countervailing
power increases. In terms of policy implication, banning slotting fees decreases wholesale
prices. When e  ∗, a ban on slotting fees imposes a binding constraint. As the
profits of the large retailer now are smaller, ∗ is less distorted than if slotting fees were
feasible.22
21Second-order conditions are assumed to hold.
22Furthermore, applying the analysis which follows, we can claim that banning slotting fees increases
industry surplus, as well as consumer surplus. It results in the ban of slotting fees increasing social
welfare.
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Another result we have is that the wholesale price paid by the large retailer is smaller
than the wholesale price of the small retailers. Investigating the upstream firm’s profits,
we breakdown the derivatives of the objective function with respect to the wholesale
prices into two terms: industry profit and the outside option. A change in  has only
a second-order effect on industry profit, while change in  has an additional effect on
the outside option which is a first-order effect. Hence, it is optimal for the supplier to
fix wholesale prices higher than zero and ∗  ∗.
Interestingly, in our model, countervailing power has effects which are different from
those commonly envisioned. First, countervailing power causes an increase in the whole-
sale price paid by the small retailers. Thus, countervailing power results in a waterbed
effect for small retailers, which is not seen in the benchmark case (without countervail-
ing power).23 This effect is brought about by the new mechanism of bargaining that
we raise. Countervailing power of the large retailer creates incentives for the supplier
to increase the wholesale price of small retailers to decrease the outside option of the
large retailer. To understand the incentives of the supplier to do so, remember that
the supplier’s sales to the fringe retailers imposes a positive externality on the larger
retailer; conversely, a reduction in the supplier’s sales to the fringe retailers imposes a
negative externality on the large retailer, by reducing screening opportunities. When the
wholesale price of small retailers increases, multistop shopping behavior is less valuable
for consumers which results in a decrease in screening opportunities of the large retailer.
Hence, the outside option of the large retailer falls.
At the same time, as screening opportunities are reduced because small retailers are
less attractive, we can see that the supplier has incentives to increase the wholesale price
of the large retailer to offset the reduction in total profits, which is caused by the rise
in the wholesale price paid by small retailers. Both wholesale prices are higher than in
the benchmark case. Consequently, countervailing power is detrimental to the interests
of the supplier and retailers as a whole, and causes a reduction in total profits.
Consumer surplus and welfare analysis
We now show that introducing countervailing power decreases the total quantity of
goods in the competitive market (as well as in the monopoly market); the quantity sold
23Inderst and Valletti (2011) show that, when a large buyer is able to obtain lower input prices from
a supplier, it is possible that other buyers will have to pay more for the same input as a result. The
mechanism that we exhibit is different. See later.
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by small retailers also decreases. The consumer surplus will decrease, as will the social
welfare, as the industry surplus is lower when the large retailer possesses countervailing
power.
We denote by  =  −  −  the consumer value of one-stop shopping. 
decreases as  increases.24 We breakdown the consumer value of multistop shopping
into the sum of two terms: the value of one-stop shopping and the additional value of
multistop shopping. Let  =  − − ( −  − ) denote the additional value of
multistop shopping.  decreases (increases) as  () increases as  ∈ (0 1) (as ∈ (−1 0)).25 The consumer value of multistop shopping is given by  + .
Suppose  possesses countervailing power, the consumer value of one-stop shopping
decreases from  =  −  (0) to ∗ =  − ∗ −  (∗), as ∗  0 Intro-
ducing countervailing power results in a discrete fall in consumer value from one-stop
shopping; the total quantity in the competitive market (as well as the total quantity
in the monopoly market) decreases. Similarly, going on the additional consumer value
of multistop shopping, we find that  decreases from  =  − ( −  (0 0)) to
∗ =  − ∗ − ( − ∗ −  (∗ ∗)) in the presence of countervailing power, as
0  ∗  ∗ and 
 = − 
 (See lemma 1). When  possesses countervailing power,
the additional consumer value of multistop shopping falls and the quantity sold by small
24 does not depend on  .
25See Lemma 1.
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retailers decreases.26
The above construction of consumer value frommultistop shopping (+) makes
the analysis easier to explain. It becomes clear that all consumers enjoy at least the
one-stop shopping value while the additional value from multistop shopping is enjoyed
only by the multistop shoppers. Consumer surplus is given as:Z 
0
( − )  () +
Z 
0
( − )  ()
where the first term represents the total value of one-stop shopping (one-stop shoppers
and multistop shoppers), while the second term is the value of additional multistop
shopping (multistop shoppers only). We first focus on the change of the total value
of one-stop shopping (analysis of the change from the additional value of multistop
shopping follows).
Suppose  possesses countervailing power, and let ∆ denote the loss in the total
value of one-stop shopping in presence of countervailing power,
∆ =
Z 
∗
(∗ − )  () +
¡ − ∗¢ (∗) 
We know that ∗  . Thus, consumers with a shopping cost exceeding ∗ do not
26Note that, we explicitly say that by introducing countervailing power, there is a discrete fall in
one-stop shopping consumer value as well as in multistop shopping additional consumer value. It does
not mean that  and  fall as countervailing power increases (e decreases). On the contrary, it is
the opposite. The reason behind this is that decreasing the outside option of the large retailer becomes
costlier as e falls. The result is that ∗ increases when e increases, as does ∗ (to offset the reduced
attractiveness of small retailers). This can be seen in the comparative statics given below:
∗
e = − ∗e| {z }
∈(01)
− 

| {z }
∈(−10)
∗
e| {z }
∈(01)
 0
∗
e = −∗e + ∗e +  
∗
e +  
∗
e =
µ∗
e − ∗e
¶
| {z }
0
µ
1 +


¶
| {z }
0
 0
because 
 = − 
 and 0  
∗  
∗  1 (See comparative statics on ∗ and ∗ in Appendix
D).
Alternative modelings of the countervailing power of the large retailer lead to an increase in retail
prices as countervailing power increases; see Subsection 4.2.
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visit  and obtain zero, while in the case of no countervailing power they obtain −
as consumption value. The first term in ∆ represents this loss. Consumers with a
shopping cost lower than ∗ shop within both regimes (with and without countervailing
power). The second term is thus the difference in the values of one-stop shopping in the
two regimes. All consumers (one-stop shoppers and multistop shoppers) face a loss in
the value of one-stop shopping due to the countervailing power of the large retailer.
The presence of countervailing power of the large retailer also affects the additional
value of multistop shopping (∗  ). Let us denote the loss in the total additional
value of multistop shopping from the countervailing power as ∆. It is given as:
∆ =
Z 
∗
¡ − ¢  () + ¡ − ∗¢ (∗) 
Countervailing power discourages consumers with a shopping cost exceeding ∗
¡ ¢
from visiting . These multistop shoppers will become one-stop shoppers instead of be-
ing multistop shoppers within the regime without countervailing power. This loss is
given by the first term. The second term represents the loss of consumers with a shop-
ping cost lower than ∗. While they still patronize both retailers, they face a loss due
to a decrease in the additional value of multistop shopping
¡ − ∗¢. All consumers
who were multistop shoppers within the regime without countervailing power face a loss
in the additional value of multistop shopping.
Overall, the countervailing power of the large retailer decreases the consumer surplus
by ∆ = ∆ + ∆. We can also breakdown the change in the consumer surplus
according to the four groups of consumers we distinguished:  ∈ (0 ∗),  ∈
¡∗ ¢,
 ∈ ¡ ∗¢ and  ∈ ¡∗ ¢.
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We can write:
∆ = £¡ − ∗¢+ ¡ − ∗¢¤ (∗)| {z }
∈(0∗)
+
¡ − ∗¢ £ ¡¢−  (∗)¤+ Z ∗
¡ − ¢  ()| {z }
∈(∗ )
+
¡ − ∗¢ £ (∗)−  ¡¢¤| {z }
∈( ∗)
+
Z 
∗
¡ − ¢  ()| {z }
∈(∗)

The four regions are provided in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Changes in consumer values at the equilibrium
We can clearly see that when  ∈ (0 ∗), multi-stop shoppers exist in both regimes
(with and without countervailing power). This is reflected in the expression above for
the region  ∈ (0 ∗), where we have the difference in one-stop shopping value as
well as the multistop shopping additional value. For the region  ∈ (∗ ), in
the presence of countervailing power, one-stop shopping prevails, while consumers are
multistop shoppers in the absence of countervailing power. Since consumer surplus
for multistop shoppers has been split into two parts, we see the difference in one-stop
shopping value for the consumers within both regimes along with a term that represents
the additional surplus multistop shoppers obtain in absence of countervailing power.
In the region  ∈ ( ∗), in both regimes we have one-stop shoppers and this is
represented as the difference in one-stop shopping value. Finally, for  ∈ ¡∗ ¢,
20
one-stop shoppers exist only in the absence of countervailing power. The discussion
above is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Countervailing power of the large retailer decreases the quantity sold by
small retailers as well as the total quantity in the competitive market (Good ). Total
quantity in the monopoly market also decreases (Good ). Consequently, countervailing
power of the large retailer decreases consumer surplus.
Proof. See Appendix E
Finally, the countervailing power of the large retailer decreases the social welfare
(industry surplus decreases, as well as consumer surplus). The loss in social welfare is
equal to
∆ =
Z 
∗
( −  − )  () +
Z 
∗
( − )  ()
in which the first term corresponds to the fall in the demand from multistop shoppers
who now become one-stop shoppers instead of being multistop shoppers and enjoyed
( −  − ) as additional surplus, and the second term is the fall in the demand from
one-stop shoppers who now do not buy.
Corollary 1 Countervailing power of the large retailer decreases social welfare.
As noted in the introduction, policy debates suggest that countervailing power is
socially desirable if lower prices paid by large retailers to their suppliers are passed on
to consumers. By showing that countervailing power can hurt consumers and social
welfare, our analysis sheds new light on these debates and can help to qualify the
conditions under which lower prices paid by large retailers to their suppliers are not
passed on to consumers. We note in our analysis, that the large retailer exerts its
market power in various ways: countervailing power (demand-side substitution) and
seller power (the large retailer offers a wide range of products while small retailers focus
on narrower product lines). It is the combination of both "countervailing power" and
"seller power" which explains that the countervailing power of the large retailer reduces
the social welfare.
Another policy implication follows: as wholesale prices are less distorted under a
ban on slotting fees, we can claim that banning slotting fees increases social welfare.
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4 Robustness and discussion
In this section, we first show in Subsection 4.1 that our analysis extends when the
comparative advantage of the large retailer is smaller (namely,   − , but still
  ). Then, we discuss the assumptions about the contracts and stress that our
insights do not depend on the modeling of the countervailing power of the large retailer
(Subsection 4.2).
4.1 Smaller comparative advantage of the large retailer
In this subsection, we now assume that ’s comparative advantage is smaller:  
 − .27 As a result,  will face a restriction on its total margin  in order to
keep attracting one-stop shoppers.
At stage two, consider  and , which are offered by the supplier at stage one,
we assume that  −    −  −  with  =  ( −  − ). Instead
of ,  should, as a result, improve its offer to attract one-stop shoppers. It is then
optimal for  to match the value offered by the competitive fringe of small retailers:
−− = − or  = −− ( − ) ( ), which gives ’s gross
profit, by replacing , equal to:
 = [ −  − ( − )] ( − )−  ( −  − ( −  − ))
with  = − ( −  − ( −  − )). The margin of the good  is unchanged.
The fringe of small retailers exerts an effective competition for one-stop shoppers, but
screening strategy is still best achieved by pricing  below cost at ( 0).
Note, we get:


¯¯¯¯
=−−(−)
=  ( −  − )−  ( −  − )|=−−(−)
which is positive by concavity of the objective function of the large retailer.
At stage one, the supplier sets contracts.
27For uniform shopping cost case,    −  yields   2 , see Appendix G.
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We first consider the case where the large retailer has no countervailing power.
The profit-maximization problem of the supplier can be written as
max
 [ ( − )−  ( −  − ( −  − ))] + 
+ ( −  − ( −  − ))
where the fixed fee is given by  =  ( ( )   )−  .
First-order conditions (applying the envelope theorem on  () and using  =
− ( −  − ( −  − ))) are
( − )
µ
1 +


¶
 ( −  − ( −  − )) = 0
− ( − )
µ
1− 


¶
 ( −  − ( −  − ))
−  ( − )− ( −  − ( − ))  ( − ) +  ( − ) = 0
Let ∗∗ and ∗∗ be the solutions of the above equations. Straightforward computations
lead to ∗∗ = ∗∗ and ∗∗ = − ( − ) +  ( − ∗∗ )  0 as


¯¯¯¯
=−−(−)
= − ( −  − ( − ))  ( − ) +  ( − )  0
Instead of having  =  = 0, as in the case of non countervailing power, equilibrium
wholesale prices are higher to reduce the competitive pressure from small retailers on
the total margin of the large retailer.
Subsequently, we introduce countervailing power of the large retailer. The profit-
maximization problem of the supplier changes as the large retailer can now substitute the
supplier in the case of a refusal. Instead of having  , in the case of a refusal, let e ()
define the new outside option of the large retailer which is a function of e (e ) e (e )  e and . Writing the profit-maximization problem of the supplier, the
first-order condition with respect to  is unchanged but the first-order condition with
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respect to  now becomes:
− ( − )
µ
1− 


¶
 ( −  − ( −  − ))
−  ( − )− ( −  − ( − ))  ( − ) +  ( − )− e = 0
Without ambiguity, the impact of the countervailing power depends on the sign of  .
If   0, wholesale prices will be higher, and the opposite will arise if   0. In
the following, we provide a sufficient condition to get higher wholesale prices in case of
countervailing power.
Proposition 4 Assuming    −    − ∗∗ , with ∗∗ = − ( − ) +
 ( − ∗∗ )  0, a high enough countervailing power leads to higher wholesale prices.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Assume −  −∗∗ , and let be = −∗∗ −³ − e ³be´´ with e ³be´ =

³
 −be− e ³be´´ define a threshold on e; we have on the interval e ∈ ³0be´ that
the large retailer is non-constrained on its total margin in the case of a refusal when
the wholesale price of small retailers equals ∗∗ .28 Previous analysis (see lemma 1)
shows that   0 in this case. Consequently, without ambiguity, a high enough
countervailing power which is characterized by e ∈ ³0be´ leads to higher wholesale
prices.29
Other results follow directly. A high enough countervailing power of the large retailer
reduces the supplier’s profits as well as the industry surplus. On the other hand, the
profits of the large retailer increase in its countervailing power and the supplier pays a
slotting fee to the large retailer (as be  ∗∗ to get  − e − e (e)   − ∗∗ and
  0). Introducing high enough countervailing power decreases consumer surplus
and consequently decreases social welfare as industry surplus is lower too.30
28Considering the uniform shopping cost case, be corresponds to −2 . See Appendix G.
29In Appendix G, the analysis of uniform shopping costs helps to illustrate this result.
30Note that by introducing countervailing power with e ∈ ³0be´, wholesale prices are higher compared
to the case in which the large retailer has no countervailing power but wholesale prices are still equal
at the equilibrium ( = )  For more, see Appendix F.
As a result, in case e ∈ ³0be´ (large countervailing power), the total demand decreases
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4.2 Discussion and alternative modeling of the countervailing
power
The above framework aims at capturing how the countervailing power can lead to higher
retail prices. The modeling choice of the countervailing power, namely, that the sup-
plier is constrained in contracting with the large retailer by the threat of demand-side
substitution, is in line with the literature. It also fits well as large retailers often have
the ability to turn to other sources of supply if they dislike the supplier’s terms.
Alternative modeling of the countervailing power has also been used in the literature.
For example, the outcome of the negotiation between the supplier and the large retailer
can be determined through the Nash’s axiomatic approach. Following the approach
developed in Chen (2003), we suppose that the contract between the supplier and the
large retailer satisfies the following two properties:31
(i) the contract ( ) is efficient in the sense that the surplus (joint profits) from
this transaction is maximized, otherwise the large retailer would want to renegotiate;
(ii) the surplus from this contract is divided according to the sharing rule , where
 ∈ (0 1) denotes the large retailer’s share of the joint profits. An increase in the amount
of the countervailing power possessed by the large retailer implies a larger share .
In this setting, negotiations are sequential: the supplier is able to commit to the
contracts with the small retailers, following which, negotiations between the supplier
and the large retailer take place according to the above approach. We show that our
insights, that is countervailing power can lead to higher retail prices and can decrease
social welfare- carry over with this modeling of negotiations.32
(which is given by  ( − )), but the quantity sold by small retailers does not change
( ( −  − ( −  − ))). The demand of multistop shoppers is unchanged; only the demand
of one-stop shoppers falls. Let ∗∗ = ∗∗ define the equilibrium wholesale prices (which solve the
first-order conditions) in case e ∈ ³0be´), we have ∗∗ = ∗∗  ∗∗ = ∗∗  0. The loss in social
welfare, which is equal to ∆ = R −∗∗−∗∗ ( − )  (), now corresponds to the fall in demand from
one-stop shoppers who do not buy, in the case of countervailing power.
31Discussions of this approach can be found in Christou and Papadopoulos (2015), and Matsushima
and Yoshida (2016).
32In the approach developed by Chen (2003), contracts between the supplier and the large retailer
are assumed to be efficient, so that only the wholesale price paid by the small retailers (and the fixed
fee between the supplier and the large retailer) varies in the countervailing power of the large retailer.
Alternatively, one can think of the outcome of the negotiation between the supplier and the large
retailer given as a random proposal of take-it-or-leave-it offers before the negotiation takes place (See
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We thus suppose that the sequence of contract negotiations is a two-stage sequence:
at stage zero, the supplier makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to each of the small retailers
(); at stage one, the contract between the supplier and the large retailer ( ) is
determined through the negotiation explained above. Then, stage two is unchanged.33
The analysis has been developed for  −   : the large retailer is not con-
strained on its total margin.34
Solving backwards, retail margins of the large retailer at stage two are unchanged.
At stage one, the supplier and the large retailer negotiate a contract ( ). The
joint profits Π from the transaction between the supplier and the large retailer can be
written:
Π =  [ ( −  − )−  ( −  − ( −  − ))] +  ( )− 
where  ( ) =  ( −  − ) −  ( −  − ( −  − )) and
 =  ( −  ) where  =  ( −  ). Differentiating Π with respect to 
and apply the envelope theorem, then  satisfies:
−
∙µ
1 +


¶
 ( −  − ) +
µ
1 +


¶
 ( −  − ( −  − ))
¸
= 0
by using  =  ( −  − ) and  = − ( −  − ( −  − )). The first-
order condition reveals that  = 0. Following the sharing rule suggested by Chen,
Chemla, 2003 for an example of this approach in use; or more recently, see Münster and Reisinger,
2015). With probability , the large retailer proposes ( ), while with probability (1− ) the
supplier proposes ( ). That is, where  = 1, the large retailer has full bargaining power, while
where  = 0 the supplier has full bargaining power. Offers to the small retailers are still made by the
supplier, and, simultaneously, with the negotiation between the supplier and the large retailer. We still
assume that contracts, in particular contracts with the small retailers cannot be conditional on any
action chosen later in the game (acceptance or refusal decision on the offers in the negotiation between
the supplier and the large retailer). We can show that, conditional on who makes the proposal, now has
an impact on the wholesale price negotiated between the supplier and the large retailer.  maximizes
the industry surplus, regardless of who makes the proposal, but varies in  . As  changes according
to who makes the proposal in the negotiation between the supplier and the large retailer,  varies in
 . Furthermore, as in Chen’s approach, retail prices will increase in .
We thank Patrick Rey for suggesting this extension. Details can be found in Appendix H.
33Still, contracts to the small retailers are not contingent to the success of negotiation between the
supplier and the large retailer.
34With   − , we can show that the results still hold as long as the comparative advantage
of the large retailer ( − ) is not too small. The proof is available upon request.
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 = (1− )Π . At stage zero, the supplier chooses the contract offered to the small
retailers. In so doing, it wants to maximize the total profits it earns from the sales to
both the small retailers and the large retailer:
 ( −  − ( − )) + (1− )Π .
Π =  ( (0 )   (0 )  0 ) −  corresponds to the gross profits of the
large retailer written at  = 0 minus the monopoly profit on the good . If we
differentiate the objective of the supplier with respect to  and apply the envelope
theorem, then  satisfies:

µ
−1 + 


¶
 ( −  − ( − )) +  ( −  − ( − )) = 0
Let ∗ denote the solution of the first-order condition. Comparative statics reveals that
∗
 = −
 ( − ∗ − ( − ))
2Π2
which is positive. An increase in the countervailing power of the large retailer increases
the wholesale price paid by the small retailers.
The countervailing power of the large retailer does not affect the value of one-stop
shopping as , which is equal to the marginal cost of production (zero), does not change
with respect to .  maximizes the joint profits from the transaction between the large
retailer and the supplier and, because of the double marginalization problem, we get
 = 0. So, the mechanism through which the countervailing power of the large retailer
brings up the wholesale price paid by the small retailers is quite similar. Consider the
change in the quantities sold in the retail market. When  increases, the sales to the
small retailers decrease, which imposes a negative externality on the large retailer due
to reduced screening opportunities. When  is larger, the supplier internalizes less of
the profits of the large retailer and so is more willing to impose a negative externality
on the large retailer by selling less through the small retailers. Therefore, the increase
in  is the result of the supplier trying to offset the reduction in profits caused by the
rise in the countervailing power .
Hence, we obtain here that an increase in the countervailing power of the large
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retailer leads to an increase in the retail prices ( = ). Consequently, consumer
surplus decreases. The present analysis in terms of consumer surplus is slightly easier
compared to the previous analysis as the value of one-stop shopping does not change in
this setting of negotiations.
Let  =  − ( −  (0 0)) with  (0 0) = − ( − ( −  (0 0))) denote the
additional value of multistop shopping for  = 0 as a benchmark and ∗ =  − ∗ −
( −  (0 ∗)) with  (0 ∗) = − ( − ( −  (0 ∗))) as the value for   0
Adding countervailing power leads to a decrease in the additional value of multistop
shopping from  to ∗. The consumer surplus decreases by:
∆ = ¡ − ∗¢ (∗) + Z ∗
¡ − ¢  ()
in which the first term corresponds to the decrease in consumer surplus of multi-stop
shoppers who now face a higher price when shopping at smaller retailers, and the second
term is the loss of consumers who now become one-stop shoppers due to the counter-
vailing power of the large retailer. Furthermore, since industry surplus is maximized for
 = 0, industry surplus decreases when we add countervailing power, as does social
welfare, which decreases by:
∆ =
Z 
∗
( −  − )  () 
The question of which of model of countervailing power is more relevant (in terms of
plausible assumptions and/or of predicted outcomes), is likely to vary across products
or industries. In the first approach, both wholesale prices change according to the
countervailing power of the large retailer, while in the second approach the wholesale
price of the small retailers increases only. However, in both cases adding countervailing
power of the large retailer decreases the social welfare.
It is worth noting that results hinge critically on the assumption that the breakdown
in negotiation between the supplier, and the large retailer cannot be contracted upon,
because of non-verifiability in court. Assume instead that the breakdown in negotiation
is contractible (as do Inderst and Wey (2003), for example), the industry surplus maxi-
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mization and the sharing of the industry surplus will be disentangled and the counter-
vailing power of the large retailer will not affect retail prices along the equilibrium path.
The same distinction arises between Caprice (2006) and Inderst and Shaffer (2011), who
adopt the same assumption as we do in this paper, and Inderst and Shaffer (2010), who
only focus on the industry surplus maximization. In practice, Möller (2007) noted that
contingent contracts are rare and hard to enforce.35
5 Conclusion
A recurring theme in the retail industry is that large retailers offer a wide range of prod-
ucts and are thus able to capture large market shares through one-stop shopping. Their
dominance in the retailing markets confers upon buyer power vis-à-vis the suppliers as
well, which allows them to obtain more favorable trade terms than other retailers.
In this article, we demonstrate that countervailing power possessed by a large retailer
can lead to a rise in retail prices for consumers as well as a decrease in social welfare.
The fixed fee paid by the large retailer to the supplier decreases, but wholesale prices
increase. While joint profits maximization calls for wholesale prices equal to marginal
cost of production, high wholesale prices are a supplier’s strategy to extract surplus
from the large retailer. Such a response by the supplier to the countervailing power of
the large retailer increases retail prices and decreases social welfare.
Thus, the countervailing power of large retailers may not lead to lower retail prices.
The analysis provides a theoretical foundation for concerns voiced by many antitrust
authorities: cost savings which only benefit the large retailers will not suffice; cost
savings need to be passed on to consumers. While the question of whether countervailing
power is socially desirable has been discussed by legal and economic scholars since the
1950s without reaching a firm conclusion, this article claims that countervailing power
decreases social welfare. Our analysis which combines seller power and buyer power
captures the main ingredients of the modern retail industry: polarization of the retail
industry and shopping costs. In our model, a large retailer, which attracts consumers
through one-stop shopping, competes with smaller retailers.
In many countries, retailers’ pricing strategies are ruled by the same general compe-
35See also Milliou and Petrakis (2007) for an interesting discussion on this point.
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tition laws as those of producers. However, during the 1990s, several countries adopted
regulations to prevent retailers from engaging in loss-leading against smaller rivals, to the
detriment of consumers.36 At the same time, OECD (2007) argues that rules against
loss-leading are likely to protect inefficient competitors and harm consumers. In our
analysis, the large retailer sells below the marginal wholesale price. Preventing the
large retailer from selling below the marginal wholesale price would shift the retail equi-
librium. The first effect would be a price-raising effect as screening opportunities of the
large retailer change. The effect of the countervailing power of the large retailer is, then
far from being clear. However, assume the countervailing power of the large retailer ben-
efits consumers, we would obtain that, preventing the large retailer from selling below
the marginal wholesale price harms consumers if the first price-raising effect is larger.
Another crucial point in banning loss-leading is the definition of the price threshold. If
the price threshold is the unit wholesale price including the fixed fee, the large retailer
does not sell below cost in any case. For example, assume the large retailer has high
countervailing power, then the supplier pays slotting fees to the large retailer, which
suggests that the large retailer does not sell below the unit wholesale price including
fixed fee. Because the large retailer’s pricing strategies are not binding in the case of
high countervailing power, prohibiting selling at a loss may simply restrain the large
retailer in the case of weak countervailing power, which leads to higher retail prices in
this case. Even if this issue is important, we make the choice not to deal with it in this
article, but to leave it for future investigations.
The countervailing power of large retailers also has an impact on suppliers’ invest-
ment incentives.37 When retailers enhance their buying power, suppliers adjust their
investments according to the new bargaining position of their buyers. The concern fre-
quently expressed in policy circles is that suppliers respond to growing buyer power
by under-investing in innovation and production. Our above analysis argues that high
wholesale prices may help to extract surplus from the large retailer, which may tend
to reduce suppliers’ investment incentives. Low wholesale prices would not favor the
36As noted by Chen and Rey (2013), below-cost resale is banned in Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxem-
bourg, Portugal and Spain, whereas it is generally allowed in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
In the United States, 22 states are equipped with general sales-below-costs laws, and 16 additional states
prohibit below-cost sales on motor fuel.
For a contribution to this topic, see for example Allain and Chambolle (2011).
37See Inderst and Wey (2011) and Caprice and Rey (2015) for contributions to this issue.
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surplus extraction from the large retailer, decreasing the supplier’s incentives to invest.
However, the impact of the supplier’s investments with respect to the conditions of retail
screening is less clear. Supplier’s investments may have effects on the consumer value
of the good at the large retailer as well as at the small retailers. The screening oppor-
tunities at the retail level may change, as may the seller power of the large retailer. We
leave the analysis of the impact of the countervailing power on suppliers’ investment
incentives, consumer surplus and social welfare, when shopping costs matter to future
researches.
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Appendix
A Proof of lemma 1
Recall first-order conditions:
 =  ( −  − 
)
 ( −  − ) =  ( −  − 
) 
 = − ( −  − ( −  − 
))
 ( −  − ( −  − )) = − ( −  − ( −  − 
)) with  () =  () () 
Comparative statics on the first-order conditions reveal that:

 = −
0 ( −  − )
1 + 0 ( −  − ) ∈ (−1 0) with 
0 ()  0,

 = 0

 = −
0 ( −  − ( −  − ))
1 + 0 ( −  − ( −  − )) ∈ (−1 0) with 
0 ()  0, and

 =
0 ( −  − ( −  − ))
1 + 0 ( −  − ( −  − )) ∈ (0 1) with 
0 ()  0,
which also implies 
 = − 
 . Moreover, using previous expressions, we have
2 =
−22 (this equality will be useful in comparative statics later).
Differentiate  with respect to  and apply the envelope theorem:

 = −
 ( −  − )−  ( −  − ( −  − )) 
Then, by using first-order conditions, we write

 = − [ ( −  − 
)−  ( −  − ( −  − ))]
which is negative as [ ( −  − )−  ( −  − ( −  − ))]  0 (one-
stop shoppers’ demand).
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We do the same with respect to :

 = 
 ( −  − ( −  − )) = − ( −  − ( −  − ))
which is negative as  ( −  − ( −  − ))  0 (multistop shoppers’ demand).
Q.E.D.
B Proof of proposition 1
Differentiate the objective function of the supplier with respect to  and , and
apply the envelope theorem (as the objective function of the supplier is a function of
). We can simplify by using the first-order conditions on  and  (with  =
 ( −  − ) and  = − ( −  − ( −  − ))), so we have:
− 
∙µ
1 +


¶
 ( −  − )
¸
+ ( − )
∙µ
1 +


¶
 ( −  − ( −  − ))
¸
= 0
− ( − )
∙µ
1− 


¶
 ( −  − ( −  − ))
¸
= 0
Using the first-order condition on , we can write  = . Recognizing that the
first-order condition on  is also a function of the first-order condition on  (as  =
−  , see lemma 1), we get  = 0. The result is  =  = 0, and the fixed fee follows
from the participation constraint of the large retailer  =  ( (0)   (0 0)  0 0)−
 . Q.E.D.
C Proof of lemma 2
Under assumption 1, − ≥ , we get −e−e ≥  which implies −e−e 
 −  for any  ≥ 0 (the large retailer is not constrained on its total margin e in
the case of a refusal). We can apply lemma 1 and   0 Q.E.D.
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D Proof of proposition 2
With countervailing power, first-order conditions are written as:
− 
∙µ
1 +


¶
 ( −  −  ())
¸
+ ( − )
∙µ
1 +


¶
 ( −  − ( −  −  ( )))
¸
= 0
− ( − )
∙µ
1− 


¶
 ( −  − ( −  − ))
¸
− e () = 0
Compared to the case without countervailing power, the first is unchanged while
a new term appears in the second. Remember ()  0 (See lemma 2), we have
   (as  ∈ (0 1), see lemma 1).
Using the first-order condition on  (with  = − 
 , see lemma 1), we can write
the first-order condition on  as follows
−
∙µ
1 +


¶
 ( −  −  ())
¸
− e () = 0
Using ()  0 and 
 ∈ (−1 0) (see lemma 1), we have   0. Consequently,
at equilibrium ∗  ∗  0; the large retailer obtains a wholesale price smaller than the
wholesale price of the small retailers and the fixed fee, from the participation constraint
is written as:  =  ( )−e (). Recognize that e ()|=0 =  (0 )
and remember that ()  0, the sign of  is negative at e = 0. By continuity,
there exists be, such that the sign of  remains negative for e  be., which means that
the supplier pays a slotting fee for countervailing power which is very large.
Comparative statics with respect to e
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For first-order conditions, we have:
−
∙µ
1 +


¶
 ( −  −  ())
¸
| {z }

+ ( − )
∙µ
1 +


¶
 ( −  − ( −  −  ( )))
¸
| {z }
−
= 0
− ( − )
∙µ
1− 


¶
 ( −  − ( −  − ))
¸
| {z }

− e ()| {z }

= 0
For the sake of exposition, let  = 0 and  = 0 denote the first-order
conditions, so we can write:
 = − = 0
 =  −  = 0
To start with comparative statics with respect to e, we introduce more comparative
statics to help us:
•   0, which is assumed to hold to satisfy the second-order condition for
the case of no screening; moreover, we recognize that  = 0;
•   0, which is assumed to hold to satisfy the second-order condition for
the case without countervailing power; moreover, by using 
2 = −
22 (see
lemma 1), we recognize that  = −, which is positive;
• lastly,  = 
2 = − 
2 = −   0
Subsequently, recognizing that e does not appear in  and , from  = 0 we
can write that is a function of. Comparative statics on the  ( ()  ) =
0 reveals that: 


 +

 = 0
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Using  = − = 0, we can write:

 =

 −  ∈ (0 1)
with  = −  0 and −  0.
With  as a function of  and  as a function of e, we can write:
 ( ( (e))   (e) e) = 0
Comparative statics on  reveal that:





e +  e + e = 0
which leads to:

e = −

 +



Using  =  −  = 0, we can write:

e =  −  ³1− ´ ∈ (0 1)
with  = −e  0 and −  ³1− ´  0 (as   0 and  ∈ (0 1)).
Industry surplus: The industry surplus in terms of wholesale prices can be written
as:
Π = ( ( −  − )−  ( −  − ( −  − )))
+ ( −  − ( −  − )) +  ( −  − )
− ( −  − ( −  − ))
Looking at the change in industry surplus with respect to the wholesale prices:
Π
 = −( − )( −  − ( −  − 
))(1− 

 )  0
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Π
 = −
∙µ
1 +


¶
 ( −  − )
¸
( − )
∙µ
1 +


¶
 ( −  − ( −  − ))
¸
We can see from the above that industry surplus is maximized at  =  = 0 and any
other configuration of the wholesale prices results in a reduction in industry surplus.
Supplier profits: We know that the supplier, by using two- part tariffs, is the
residual claimant to the industry surplus after satisfying the large retailer’s participa-
tion constraint. The supplier’s profit is denoted as Π and can be brokendown as the
difference between the industry profit and the outside option of the large retailer. The
supplier’s profit without countervailing power is given as:
Π(0 0) = Π(0 0)− 
The supplier’s profit with countervailing power is given as:
Π(∗ ∗) = Π(∗ ∗)− e(∗)
Taking the difference between the two, we have:
Π(0 0)−Π(∗ ∗) = Π(0 0)−Π(∗ ∗)| {z }
0
− ( − e(∗))| {z }
0
 0
The first term is obtained from the previous result that industry profit is maximized
at  =  = 0, while the second term is negative, because for countervailing power
being present, we have e(∗))   , otherwise the retailer would prefer to obtain
monopoly profits on the good .
Further, as countervailing power increases (e falls), we see that wholesale prices fall.
This results in industry profits rising along with a rise in the outside option of the large
retailer.
Retail profits: By introducing credible countervailing power, the large retailer
obtains higher profits since e(∗)   . Further,we know that in the presence of
credible countervailing the wholesale prices are characterized as ∗  ∗  0. As
countervailing power increases, the outside option increases because the equilibrium
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wholesale price ∗ satisfies 1  
∗
e  0.
Slotting fees: The fixed fee, from the participation constraint is given as  =
 ( ) − e (). Notice that e () |=0 =  (0 ) and remember that
()
  0. Since ∗  0 in presence of countervailing power, we have  ∗  0 as
 (∗ ∗)  e (∗) for ∗  0. By continuity, there exists be, such that the sign
of  remains negative for e  be, which means that the supplier pays a slotting fee for
countervailing power which is very large. Q.E.D.
E Proof of proposition 3
We need to show that the associated consumer value from one-stop shopping  =
 −  − () as well as the additional value of multistop shopping  =  −
 − ( −  − ( )) are lower in the presence of countervailing power.
We know that without countervailing power  =  = 0, the associated values are
given as:
 =  −  (0)
 =  − ( − (0 0))
In presence of countervailing power the wholesale prices are characterized as ∗  ∗ 
0:
∗ =  − ∗ −  (∗)
∗ =  − ∗ − ( − ∗ − (∗ ∗))
We know that  is a function of  only and taking the derivative with respect to
, we get: 
 = −1−

  0
where we know

 ∈ (−1 0). So we get the result that in the presence of counter-
vailing power, the consumer value of one-stop shopping and hence the total demand are
lower.
We continue with the additional value of multistop shopping, which is given as
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 = −−(−−( )). We know that in the presence of countervailing
power ∗  ∗  0, the change in  is given as the total differential:
( ) = 
( )
 ∆ +
( )
 ∆ (1)
=
( )
| {z }
0
(∆ −∆)| {z }
0
 (2)
The first term in the second equation comes from
( )
 = −
( )
 and
the second term comes from the fact that ∗  ∗  0 and ∆ = ∗ − 0 for  ∈
{ }. Here we see that in the presence of countervailing power there is an increase
in ( ), because we know that (∗ ∗)  (0 0). This result along with
∗  ∗  0 gives us:
(0 0)− (∗ ∗) = (∗ − ∗) + (∗ ∗)− (0 0)  0
This gives us the result that in the presence of countervailing power, there is a jump
downwards in the additional value of multistop shopping. Q.E.D.
F Proof of proposition 4
Assume −    −∗∗ , and let be =  −∗∗ − ³ − e ³be´´ with e ³be´ =

³
 −be− e ³be´´ define a threshold on e. For e ∈ ³0be´, we get −e−e (e) 
 − ∗∗ , which means that the large retailer is not constrained on its total margine (e) in the case of refusal. e (e) is written as e ³be´ = ³ −be− e ³be´´,
which corresponds to the interior solution. Lemma 1 applies and   0.
Let ∗∗  ∗∗ define the equilibrium wholesale prices for e ∈ ³0be´, ∗∗ and
∗∗ solve the following first-order conditions:
( − )
µ
1 +


¶
 ( −  − ( −  − )) = 0
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− ( − )
µ
1− 


¶
 ( −  − ( −  − ))
−  ( − )− ( −  − ( − ))  ( − ) +  ( − )− e = 0
in which  = − ( −  − ( − e− e))  0. Straightforward computations
show that ∗∗ = ∗∗ and ∗∗ = ∗∗  ∗∗ = ∗∗ by concavity of the objective
function as   0.
Note, countervailing power only impacts the total demand (loss in demand  ( − ∗∗ )−

³
 − ∗∗
´
) while the demand of multistop shoppers does not change as whole-
sale prices are still equal at the equilibrium ∗∗ = ∗∗ (see the expression of
the demand of multistop shoppers which is given by  ( −  − ( −  − )) =
 ( − ( − )) with
 = − ( −  − ( −  − )) = − ( − ( − ))) Q.E.D.
G An example: uniform shopping costs
(      0)
To illustrate our results, we suppose that shopping cost is uniformly distributed:
 () = . The monopoly profit on the good  is  ( − ), which results in retail
margin  = 2 and profits  = 
2
4
. Thus, as long as  −  ≥  (Assumption 1),
which corresponds to v 2v, ’s retail margins are given by:
 =  − 2 and 
 = − −  − ( − )2 
In this way,  obtains:
 −  = ( − )
2
4
+
( −  − ( − ))2
4
− 
Without countervailing power, the supplier sets:
 =  = 0 and  =  −  = 
2
4
+
( − )2
4
− 
2
4

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With countervailing power, the outside option of the large retailer is given by (instead
of  ): e = ( − e)2
4
+
( −  − ( − e))2
4

after replacing retail margins, e = −2 and e = −−−(−)2 . The participation
constraint of the large retailer becomes:
 −  ≥ e.
Solving the first-order conditions of the supplier, we obtain:
∗ = 2∗ and ∗ =  − ( − e)3 
The supplier pays slotting fees for ∗  e which corresponds to e  −2 (when
  3 , we obtain slotting fees for any e  ).
When instead 2v v,  maintains the subsidy  but may charge only  =
−−( − ) to one-stop shoppers if −−  − with  = −2 .
If v 2v, which corresponds to  −  −    −  as long as   ,
the large retailer is not constrained in its total retail margin along the equilibrium path.
Without countervailing power, the results do not change:  =  = 0 and  =
− . With countervailing power, the results may change if −e−e  −
with e = −2 . If −e−e  −,  should charge  = −e−( − )
to attract one-stop shoppers (in the case of refusal); its outside option becomes:
e = [ − e− ( − )] ( − ) + ( −  − ( − e))2
4
instead of (−)
2
4
+ (−−(−))
2
4
.
First, note that for e = 0,  − e − e = 2   −  for any  ≥ 0 because
  2. The result is that, in e = 0, equilibrium wholesale prices are given by:
∗ = 2∗ and ∗ =  − ( − e)3 (from the above case).
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In e = ,  − e− e = 2   −  for    − 2  0. Consequently, for
 = 0, the large retailer is constrained in its total retail margin, off-equilibrium (in the
case of refusal). Then, assume that  = ∗ = 23 [ − ( − e)] (the solution from the
above case), we can check that  − e− e   − ∗ as long as   23, which is
true by assumption as    (the inequality   23 is obtained for e = ). The
result is that ∗ = 23 [ − ( − e)] is a local solution. Then, we study the conditions
under which this local solution is a global solution too. Off-equilibrium, considering

¯¯¯
=0
in the constrained case, we have:
e

¯¯¯¯
=0
= − − 1
2
( − e) + 3
2

We can check that this derivative is negative for any e   if   32. The result
is that we obtain 
¯¯¯
=0
 0 if   32, 
¯¯¯
=0
 0, for any e  , and
∗ = 23 [ − ( − e)] is a global solution (no change from the above case). For  
3
2
, 
¯¯¯
=0
becomes positive when e is very large. Two local solutions should be
considered:
 =  = 0 and ∗ = 2∗ with ∗ =  − ( − e)3 .
A sufficient condition is to compare the profits of the supplier for e = . Calculations
show that when 3
2
  
√
2√
3
¡√
6− 1¢ , ∗ = 2∗ with ∗ = −(−)3 is a global
solution for any e  . Lastly, if     √2√3 ¡√6− 1¢ ,  =  = 0 becomes a
global solution when e is very large. Comparing the profits of the supplier in the two
local solutions, we find that, for e  3 +  − 4 +√6 ( − ),  =  = 0 is a
global solution.
To sum up,
if  
√
2√
3
¡√
6− 1¢ , ∗ = 2∗ with ∗ = −(−)3 ;
if  
√
2√
3
¡√
6− 1¢ , we obtain ∗ = 2∗ with ∗ = −(−)3 when 0  e 
3+−4+√6 ( − ), and,  =  = 0 when e  3+−4+√6 ( − ).
As long as the comparative advantage of the large retailer is large enough ( √
2√
3
¡√
6− 1¢ ), any countervailing power of the large retailer leads to higher wholesale
prices for any e  . When the comparative advantage is smaller, only large enough
countervailing power (e  3 +  − 4 + √6 ( − )) leads to higher wholesale
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prices; by contrast, small countervailing power (e  3+−4+√6 ( − )) does
not change the equilibrium wholesale prices:  =  = 0. Note, however that fixed
fees change as e varies.
If v 2v, the constraint on the total retail margin may apply along the equilib-
rium path and off-equilibrium (in the case of countervailing power). Without counter-
vailing power, the participation constraint of the large retailer is written as − ≥
 with:
 = [ −  − ( − )] ( − ) + ( −  − ( − ))
2
4
as the large retailer is constrained on its total retail margin ( = −−( − )
to attract one-stop shoppers). The optimization problem of the supplier leads to:
∗∗ = ∗∗ =  − 2 
Introducing countervailing power does not change the constraint on the total retail
margin along the equilibrium path. Off-equilibrium, the constraint on the total retail
margin will depend on e: it is binding if  − e− e   − or it is not binding if
 − e− e ≥  − , with e = −2 .
Note, −e−e ≥ −∗∗ when e is small, and in particular for e = 0 ¡e ≤ −2 ¢;
the result is that the large retailer is not constrained on its total retail margin in the
case of refusal and 
¯¯¯
=∗∗
= −−∗∗ −(−)
2
 0 (see lemma 1). By concavity
of the objective function, we find that wholesale prices are higher when countervailing
power is introduced as we have shown in the main text for e which is close to zero. Let
∗∗∗ and ∗∗∗ define equilibrium wholesale prices in the case of countervailing power,
we find that
∗∗∗ = ∗∗∗ =  − 25 −
1
5
( − e)  ∗∗ = ∗∗ =  − 2 if e is close to zero.
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If e is larger, two regimes should be considered:
regime 1: ∗∗∗ = ∗∗∗ =  − 25 −
1
5
( − e)  ∗∗ = ∗∗ 
(see previously) and,
regime 2: ∗∗∗ = ∗∗∗ =  − ( + e)  ∗∗ = ∗∗ 
The second regime is obtained by considering that  is constrained along the equilibrium
path and off-equilibrium ( − e− e   − , with e = −2 ). In this regime,

¯¯¯
=∗∗
 0 with uniform shopping cost, which leads to lower wholesale prices in
the case of countervailing power. The threshold value in e is obtained by comparing the
maximized profits of the supplier in the two regimes which are
regime 1:  [( − )− ( −  − ( −  − ))] +  ( −  − ( −  − ))
+ − [e ( − e− e)− e ( −  − ( −  − ))]
regime 2:  [( − )− ( −  − ( −  − ))] +  ( −  − ( −  − ))
+ − [( − e− ( − )) ( − )− e ( −  − ( −  − ))]
with  = [ −  − ( − )] ( − ) + (−−(−))24 and replacing  =
 =  − 25 − 15 ( − e) in regime 1 and  =  =  − ( + e) in regime 2.
Calculations show that regime 1 leads to higher profits if e ≤ −
3
and the supplier
is better off in regime 2 if e  −
3
. To sum up, introducing countervailing power leads
to higher wholesale prices if e ≤ −
3
and the opposite occurs if e  −
3
:
∗∗∗ = ∗∗∗ =  − 25 −
1
5
( − e)  ∗∗ = ∗∗ =  − 2
if e ≤  − 
3

∗∗∗ = ∗∗∗ =  − ( + e)  ∗∗ = ∗∗ =  − 2
if e   − 
3
 Q.E.D.
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H Alternative modeling of the countervailing power
of the large retailer
In this Appendix, we assume, before stage one, that there is a random take-it-or-leave-it
proposal between the supplier and the large retailer. Bargaining power is modeled as
the probability of making the offer ( ): the large retailer proposes with probability
, while the supplier proposes with probability (1− ). That is, if  = 1, the large
retailer has full bargaining power, while if  = 0 the supplier has full bargaining power.
Simultaneously, the supplier makes offers to the small retailers. We still assume that
contracts to the small retailers cannot be conditional on any action chosen later in the
game, such as acceptance or rejection decision of the offers in the negotiation between
the supplier and the large retailer. The second stage is unchanged.
In the following, we assume that  −  ≥ 
With probability (1− ), the supplier proposes ( ) to the large retailer and,
simultaneously,  to the small retailers. The large retailer accepts or rejects the offer
of the supplier. The solution is given as in the benchmark case (without countervailing
power):  =  = 0 and  =  (0 0)−  .
With probability , the large retailer proposes ( ) to the supplier and, simulta-
neously, the supplier proposes  to the small retailers. The supplier accepts or rejects
the offer of the large retailer.
The large retailer chooses ( ) to maximize its profits given as  (   )−
 with  satisfying:
 [ ( −  − )−  ( −  − ( −  − ))]
+  ( −  − ( −  − )) +  ≥  ( − ) 
The participation constraint of the supplier holds with equality, which leads to:
max
 [ ( −  − )−  ( −  − ( −  − ))]
+  ( −  − ( −  − )) +  (   )−  ( − ) 
Let  () denote the best response of the large retailer for which  is given;
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 () maximizes the industry surplus and satisfies the following first-order con-
dition:
( − )
µ
1 +


¶
 ( −  − ( −  − ))
− 
µ
1 +


¶
 ( −  − ) = 0
Let  =  ( −  ) denote the monopoly margin of the supplier yielding as profits
  ( −  ). The supplier chooses  . Consequently, with probability , the sup-
plier chooses  and the large retailer chooses  (), which results in the following
fixed fee:
 =   ( −  )
− £ ( ) £ ¡ −  ( )− ¢−  ¡ −  − ¡ −  ( )− ¢¢¤
+ 
¡ −  − ¡ −  ( )− ¢¢¤
Q.E.D.
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